When visiting the grave of a Civil War personality, what comes to mind? Of course, I know that is dependant on a number of things. For me, as strange as it may seem to some, one of my favorite graves to visit is that of John Brown Baldwin. Yes, Baldwin met with Lincoln, like any number of people, so that’s not the thrill of standing next to his grave. Rather, the thrill is that Baldwin had a conversation with Lincoln that may well have brought the rumblings of war to a standstill, even if only temporarily.
As some may already know, Baldwin was a firm Unionist and, though the Wikipedia citation states otherwise, voted for secession (he was one of a few who initially voted against secession on April 17, but changed their vote). I’ve been long intrigued by the discussion had between Baldwin and Abraham Lincoln on April 4, 1861. As I have already stated, Baldwin was in a unique position in April 1861. Yet, the thing that bothers me is that his testimony was presented on February 10, 1866 (an early dose of the events of the “Civil War as memory” anyone?), and it didn’t entirely mesh with a conversation that John Minor Botts had with Lincoln (as presented in his testimony of February 15, 1861). So, who was not exactly on the level in 1866? Sad to say, the board couldn’t ask Lincoln in 1866! I can’t help but think that either one or both Baldwin and Botts were influenced in their testimony by any number of things that took place during the war. Four months after his meeting with Lincoln, Baldwin was appointed colonel of the 52nd Virginia Infantry. So, some might think that the level of his conditionality as a Unionist was fairly obvious (but no so fast… considering his being allowed to serve as a member of the Virginia Legislature from 1865-67). On the other hand, Botts met some pretty harsh treatment as an enduring Unionist throughout the war. He, of course, was a member of the Virginia Loyalists Convention of 1866.
If I could have been assured that I would not be among those flies “swatted,” I would have relished the opportunity to have been the fly on the wall in both Baldwin’s meeting with Lincoln and Botts’ subsequent meeting, just to know the facts as they stood in April 1861, and not as they were remembered in the wake of all that had transpired, by 1866.
James F. Epperson
March 9, 2009
Like you, I have long been fascinated by the Lincoln-Baldwin meeting. I agree that the 1866 testimony of all the surviving principals may have been a bit less than perfect. As I am sure you know, Botts and Baldwin were having a political fight for control of Virginia, and this may have played a role.
To me, Baldwin seems like an arrogant man, and I think this played a role. He came to tell the President how to handle things, not to listen. I also think that the two men may simply have failed to communicate.
cenantua
March 15, 2009
James, I think Baldwin went into the meeting with an attitude and it wasn’t conducive to the nature of the meeting to begin with. He was on a mission, but I think he was leaning in a direction that was not in the best interest of the peacekeepers. I think Botts’ testimony, especially in terms with his discussion with Lincoln after the Baldwin-Lincoln meeting, shows that Baldwin was not, as you suggest, listening. In the end, I think there was misunderstanding between the two (Baldwin and Lincoln), but I think Baldwin may have been at greater fault.
Waverly Adcock
March 16, 2009
Robert,
This is very fascinating and a interesting read. I started reading Col. Baldwin’s testimony and I clearly see he is presenting a one sided view of this conversation with Lincoln. Thank you for sharing.
cenantua
March 16, 2009
Thanks for commenting Wav, When it comes to Staunton… between this story and the one with all of the dark dealings that led up to the Letcher-Wise Harpers Ferry thing, I don’t know which one intrigues me more.
James F. Epperson
March 18, 2009
OK, I have heard rumblings, but never the full story. What is “the Letcher-Wise Harpers Ferry thing” about?
cenantua
March 18, 2009
Despite Letcher being governor, former Gov. Wise took it upon himself to get the expedition rolling for taking Harpers Ferry, even before Virginia’s final decision on secession. Needless to say, it was very undermining of Letcher’s authority and it wasn’t exactly in harmony with the Virginia peace efforts that were going on at the same time. I have a feeling Baldwin knew about this even as he met with Lincoln. I may be wrong, but the pieces seem to fit together.
Staunton was the launching point for several troops headed in that direction. If memory serves me, I think Imboden was also a key figure in the plans (he also was commander of the Staunton Artillery at the time).
James F. Epperson
March 18, 2009
Thanks. Is it discussed in any books on the period?
cenantua
March 18, 2009
Yes, but I’ll need to get back to you on that one. I want to say that it shows up in at least two books, and there may be something about it in old newspaper articles in the Valley of the Shadow site.
James F. Epperson
March 18, 2009
Thanks (again). If you find any references, just send me an email: jfepperson@gmail.com
Waverly Adcock
March 18, 2009
Robert,
Was there any information that the West Augusta Guard was involved with the plan for the preemptive strike on Harpers Ferry?
cenantua
March 18, 2009
Yes, Waters’ company was still part of the 160th Virginia Militia (one of the militia regiments of W.H. Harman’s brigade) at the time. They mounted the train cars at Staunton on the evening of April 17, along with Imboden’s company of artillery.